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USING FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES (The Worth of the Various Types of Legislative History Documents)
	Norman Singer, professor of law at the University of Alabama, has published an eight volume set on drafting and interpreting statutes.  Statutes and Statutory Construction, West Group. (KF 425.S9).  In volume 2A of the 2000 Revision, Professor Singer makes the following observations about the various legislative history document types: Conference Reports
		Since the conference report represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses of Congress, next to the statute itself, it is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent.  Singer at §48:08 (with case citations).
	Committee Reports
		Committee reports have been said to be the most persuasive indicia of Congressional intent. ... Statements in committee reports have been held to carry greater weight than statements of legislators in the course of debates.  Singer at §48:06 (with case citations).
	Committee Hearings
		Statements of the draftsman of a proposed bill concerning his [sic] understanding of its nature and effect, made at the committee hearings, have been accepted in the federal courts as indicative of the legislative intent.  If the bill or a portion of it remains unchanged, it is reasonably assumed that the legislature adopted the view of the draftsman.  Similarly, if the legislature adopts an amendment urged by a witness, it may be assumed that the intent voiced was adopted by the legislature.  Generally statements made by others at the committee hearings concerning the nature and effect of a bill are not accorded any weight.  Singer at §48:10 (with case citations).
	Is it Appropriate to Use a Legislative History?           It is worth noting that not all jurists and legal scholars feel that it is appropriate to use extrinsic aids such as a legislative history in order to construe the meaning of a statute. The following are quotations from just a few of the many jurists and scholars who have voiced an opinion on the subject:      For the Use of Legislative Histories
		Using legislative history to help interpret unclear statutory language seems natural.   Legislative history helps a court understand the context and purpose of a statute. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative history in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 848 (1992). If we are serious about respecting the will of Congress, how can we ignore Congress' chosen methods for expressing that will? …[L]egislative history is the authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress.  It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation, and it represents the way Congress communicates with the country at large. Patricia M Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 306 (1990).
	Against the Use of Legislative Histories
		Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen … are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-192 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring). My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's meaning. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Amy Gutmann, ed., Princeton University Press (1997), 29-30. (KF 4552.S28). (Note: At least one scholar has concluded that the recent decrease in the Supreme Court's reliance on legislative history documents is attributable in part to Justice Scalia's criticism of their use.  See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 Harvard Journal on Legislation 369 (1999) updating the work of Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The Supreme Court and the use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 Jurimetrics J. 294, 297-306 (1982).) [Legislative materials] at best can shed light only on the 'intent' of that small portion of Congress in which such records originate; they therefore lack the holistic 'intent' found in the statute itself.  Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke L.J. 371, 375.
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